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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2006); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (2008) (providing
for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings) and § 34A-2-801(8) (2009).
ISSUE
Issue:

Did the Commission properly dismiss Mr. Keller's claim and the

subsequent claim filed by his estate due to the death of Mr. Keller?
Standard of Review: This is a question of law where appellate review gives no
deference to the agency's determination. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177
(Utah 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (1975) was the permanent total disability statute
in effect at the time of Mr. Keller's industrial accident and is controlling. Section 34A-2423 is also referenced. Full copies of the statutes are provided in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS
This case involves primarily procedural issues. Therefore, the statement of the
facts and the statement of the case are combined.
1.

On July 25, 1975, Thomas Keller was injured in a compensable industrial
accident.

2.

On June 29, 1978, a Compensation Agreement was approved by the
Commission memorializing an impairment rating.
1
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3.

On December 1, 2000, Mr. Keller filed an Application for Hearing claiming
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits retroactively to his July
25, 1975 date of injury. (Addendum E).

4.

During the litigation of his claim, Mr. Keller refused to cooperate with
discovery, including the taking of his deposition to establish the pertinent
facts of the case. (Addendum F). The deposition was never accomplished.

5.

On September 3, 2002, Mr. Keller passed away. (R. at 124).

6.

Contrary to the petitioner's alleged facts, Oii October 11, 2002, these
respondents sent a letter to Judge Eblen requesting the claim be dismissed
with prejudice due to Mr. Keller's passing and the current state of the law.
(Addendum G).

7.

On October 23, 2002, Judge Eblen dismissed the Application for Hearing
noting that under the current law the "claim cannot proceed". (R at 4,
Addendum u).

8.

On December 10, 2002, counsel for petitioner requested the proceedings in
the matter be stayed pending a decision from the appellate courts on a
similar case. (R. at 151, Addendum H). The letter was filed, untimely, 18
days after the time allowed for a Motion for Review. The Commission
took no action in response to the letter.

9.

Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-423, which allows a claim previously filed
by an injured worker to be pursued by the estate in case of death, was
enacted in 2003.
2
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10.

On April 25, 2005, Kelari Mecham filed an Amended Application for
Hearing on behalf of the estate. (Rat 6).

11.

On June 16, 2006, Judge Sessions entered an Order of Dismissal with
prejudice that stated, among other things, that the estate could not pursue
benefits. (R at 189, Addendum C). The decision was affirmed by the
Commission by Order dated March 31, 2009. The Commission specifically
noted the law at the time of Mr. Keller's injury, and at the time of his death,
did not allow the estate to pursue benefits. (R at 246, Addendum B).

12.

On April 27, 2009, petitioner filed both a Petition for Review and a
Docketing Statement.

13.

On May 6, 2009, this Court issued a briefing schedule giving the petitioner
until June 18, 2008 to file a brief.

14.

On June 22, 2009, this Court granted the petitioner an extension to file a
brief by July 20, 2009.

15.

Petitioner failed to file a timely brief and respondents requested dismissal
of this appeal, which was granted on July 29, 2009, but gave the petitioner
additional time to respond.

Thereafter, petitioner requested another

extension, which was granted over objections to the same on August 13,
2009. The Order gave petitioner until September 16, 2009 to file a brief
and specifically stated no further extensions would be granted absent a
showing of emergency circumstances.
16.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on August 28, 2009.
3
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17.

On October 19, 2009, the Court issued an Order denying the Motion for
Summary Disposition and requiring the petitioner to file a brief compliant
with the Rules of Appellate Procedure by October 27, 2009.

18.

On October 27, 2009, petitioner filed her brief.

19.

On November 17, 2009, the Court issued an Order requiring petitioner file
to file a courtesy brief.

20.

Respondents believe no courtesy brief was ever filed by petitioner.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Commission properly dismissed with prejudice the claim for permanent total
disability benefits arising from Mr. Kellers' July 25, 1975 industrial accident. Longestablished case law held that benefits that had not vested at the time of the injured
worker's death were not payable to the injured worker's estate. Therefore, Mr. Keller's
death extinguished his claim for permanent total disability benefits.
In addition, Mr. Kellers' death made it impossible for the Commission to make a
final finding of permanent total disability due to the requirement in Utah Code Annotated
§ 35-1-67 that the Commission refer the injured worker to the divisional of vocational
rehabilitation for certification of the injured workers ability to work or be retrained.
Because no final finding could be made, benefits could not be awarded to Mr. Keller or
his estate.
The Commission's dismissal of these matters with prejudice was proper under the
doctrine of res judicata afforded formal adjudicative proceedings in administrative
settings.
4
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The petitioner's brief did not comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
as required by prior Order of this Court. Therefore, the matter should be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
I. Mr. Keller9s claim for permanent total disability failed upon his death.
Case law at the time of Mr. Kellers' death did not allow the estate, or his
dependents to receive benefits based on undetermined benefits. The Court in Pacific
States Cast Iron Pipe Co. V. Industrial Comm'n, 218 P.2d 970, 971 (Utah 1950)
indicated,
under the terms of the statute [the decedent's] dependents
cannot obtain the benefits of the extension [of the limitations
period] unless his claim has ripened into an award for or
payments of compensation.
Id. at 974.
Although petitioner correctly notes that Pacific States was a case involving the
occupational disease of silicosis, the argument that the case is inapplicable is in error.
The Court in Pacific States relied on analogous case law from Parker v. Industrial
Comm'n, 50 P.2d 278 (Utah 1935) and Heiselt v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 P. 589 (Utah
1921). Parker was a case involving temporary total and permanent partial disability
benefits from an industrial accident (not an occupational disease claim for silicosis). In
Parker, the order awarding benefits was issued prior to the injured workers death.
In Heiselt, the Court noted, "[w]e can hardly conceive of a right passing to an
estate unless the right had vested in some one while living." Heiselt at 591. However,
that claim dealt with permanent partial disability benefits, not permanent total disability
5
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benefits. The injured worker in that case suffered injuries that resulted in amputations to
his fingers. Id. at 589-90. Unlike some impairments, amputations are and were covered
by a specific schedule. As noted by the Court, permanent partial disability benefits,
based on the loss of a member, immediately vested by virtue of the statute. Id. at 591.
These cases established the principle of law that after the death of the injured worker an
estate may only receive payment for accrued benefits that have vested.
Pacific States merely explained the meaning of '"accrued benefits" further and how
they vest. The Court in Pacific States specifically explained,
Since no award had been made prior to the death of the
employee and since no determination of causation or the
weekly amounts to be paid had been made before that time, it
would appear that no payments could have accrued. . . . It
would, therefore, appear that had the legislature when it
passed the latter act, intended to modify the rule that
unaccrued payments would vest rights in dependents or
personal representatives, it would have provided for tolling
the limitation period by the filing of a claim so that an award
could be made after death.
Id. at 974. (Emphasis added).
Petitioner suggests that because there was an accident with an impairment rating
that the permanent total disability benefits had accrued and were "due and owing from his
employer." (Petitioner's Brief at 10). However, the passage of time alone does not mean
benefits accrue.
Moreover, whether or not the benefits may have accrued, the Petitioner has failed
to address the vesting of the benefits. Mr. Keller did not have a vested interest in
permanent total disability benefits because no determination regarding whether he was
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permanently and totally disabled had been made prior to his death and the benefits did
not vest pursuant to any statute. At the time of Mr. Keller's death, there had been no
determination of causation, i.e, compensability of the claim for permanent total disability
benefits. There is no record of whether Mr. Keller worked after his injury, what jobs he
looked for, what other health conditions he may have had, or other factors that may affect
whether Mr. Keller was truly permanently and totally disabled and, if so, whether the
industrial accident caused the disability. Therefore, entitlement to benefits ceased upon
his death.
The law in effect at the time of the injury, which governs this claim, did not
include any provisions that would allow the estate to maintain a claim for undetermined
benefits. As the Court noted in Pacific States, it would have been an easy thing for the
legislature to remedy the issue so death did not end liability, Id., but no such remedy was
made until 2003 in the form of U.C. A. § 34A-2-423. Although the estate filed its claim
in 2005, the 1975, not the 2005, law governs this matter.
Mr. Keller, the injured worker died in 2002. Although § 34A-2-423 was amended
in 2003 to allow claims to survive the death of the injured worker, the statute is
substantive, not procedural, and, therefore, cannot be applied retroactively. (If retroactive
application of the statute were allowed, retroactive application of other statutes, such as
the 12 year statute of limitations on filing the claim found in § 34A-2-417, would also be
required, thus barring even the decedent's claim for permanent total disability.)
Therefore, respondents assert this claim is barred by the death of Mr. Keller based on
long-standing case law and statutes that existed at the time of the accident and even at the
7
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time of Mr. Keller's death and holds that an estate may not pursue benefits that have not
accrued and vested in the injured worker at the time of death.

II. Section 35-1-67 (1975) prevents an award in this matter.
Not only is retroactive application of § 34A-2-423 not appropriate due to the
substantive nature of the statute, but it would conflict with § 35-1-67(1975), which
prevents an award in this matter. Section 35-1-67 (1975) states,
that a finding by the commission of permanent total disability
shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as
the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be
permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that
the industrial commission of Utah refer such employee to the
division of vocational rehabilitation .. . for rehabilitation
training .... If and when the division of vocational
rehabilitation . .. certifies to the industrial commission of
Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with
the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall
order that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits . ..
(Emphasis added). Unlike the present permanent total disability statute, § 34A-2413, which allows payment of subsistence benefits following the tentative finding of
permanent total disability, but before a final award is made, benefits may only be paid out
under § 35-1-67 (1975) after the final order is issued. Because a deceased injured worker
cannot be referred to the division of vocational rehabilitation and thereby have his ability
to be retrained assessed, there can be no final order and the Commission can never order
that benefits be paid. Based on the above, this claim is moot.
8
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III.

A Stipulation in a separate case with different parties is not binding.

Petitioner's only other argument is that the stipulation reached in Smith v. Labor
Common, Supreme Court Case No. 20010738-SC (incorrectly cited by petitioner) is
controlling. However, the Supreme Court did not issue an opinion in Smith and the
Stipulation reached in Smith provides no precedential support.
There is no decision from the Supreme Court in Smith on whether a claim survives
the death of the injured worker. Rather, the employer and insurance carrier in Smith
stipulated that the changes to § 34A-2-423 governed that claim, and the Commission,
having no liability in the matter, signed off on the Stipulation because it was a party to
the appeal. Therefore, the true impact of the Stipulation was on the employer and carrier
in that matter, not the Commission, and does not set policy or establish a principle of law.
Because there is no supporting case law for applying § 34A-2-423 to cases before its
enactment, petitioner's argument is in essence that respondents are bound by the
Stipulation reached in Smith, when respondents were not even a party to that case.
However, such a stipulation does not meet the requirements of res judicata and has no
effect on these proceedings. See Macris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93.

IV.

The Commission has authority to dismiss claims with prejudice.

Petitioner argues that the Commission lacks the ability to dismiss claims with
prejudice based on the Commission's continuing jurisdiction. The cases relied upon by
Petitioner for this argument do not support the same. Doubletree v. Industrial Comm'n,
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797 P.2d 464 (Utah App. 1990) was addressing the Commission's authority to dismiss a
case without prejudice. It is clearly implied from the body of that decision that the
Commission had authority to dismiss claims with prejudice, but that a dismissal based on
procedural errors is more properly done without prejudice. Id. Bacon v. Industrial
Common, 854 P.2d 548 (Ut. App. 1991), addressed the issue of whether the Commission
abused its discretion by dismissing a claim with prejudice again for procedural errors.
Once again, it is clear that the Commission had the discretion to dismiss a claim with
prejudice, but the issue was whether it was done properly. IdL at 549.
In essence, petitioner argues that the Commission lacks the authority to issue a
binding decision that would have res judicata effect on subsequent proceedings. This
argument stands in direct opposition to many appellate cases specifically upholding the
application of res judicata in workers compensation matters. See Acosta v. Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center, 2004 UT App. 411, Crafts v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App.
238, and Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 2006 UT App. 179.
If Commission decisions had no res judicata effect, workers compensation
litigation would be meaningless as any party could continually challenge an adverse
decision. However, there is simply no statutory or case law support to assume that the
Commission lacks the authority to dismiss a case with prejudice simply because it has
continuing jurisdiction. Therefore, the argument should be rejected and the
Commission's decision upheld.
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V. Petitioner's Brief does not comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on August 28, 2009. The
Motion was denied by the Court on October 19, 2009. In its Order, the Court specifically
ordered that the petitioner's brief shall conform to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The Court stated that, if petitioner's brief did not conform to Rule 24, the
appeal may be dismissed.
Rule 24 (a)(l 1)(C) requires the brief to contain an addendum including the
challenged findings of fact and conclusions of law. The addendum to the brief, however,
contains none of the orders related to the case at hand. All the information contained in
the addendum is from other cases.
In addition, due to petitioner's failure to file a courtesy brief, the Court issued an
Order on November 17, 2009 requiring the courtesy brief be filed within seven days. No
courtesy brief has been filed. Based on the above, petitioner's brief does not comply with
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and this matter should be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
The Commission properly dismissed the claim for permanent total
disability benefits whether filed by Mr. Keller himself or re-filed by his estate. The death
of Mr. Keller extinguished his claim for permanent total disability benefits because there
had not been, nor could there be a finding of permanent total disability at the time of his
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death. Therefore, no benefits had been awarded, nor had any benefits vested in Mr.
Keller.
The Commission properly dismissed the claim with prejudice because the doctrine
of continuing jurisdiction does not eliminate the Commission's ability to adjudicate
claims and issue rulings that have res judicata effect. Therefore, the Commission's
decision should be upheld.
Petitioner's appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with prior Orders
from this Court.

DATED this

day of

, 2010.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

MARKR. SUMSION
Attorneys for Petitioners
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*1975 Amendment*
35-1-67. Schedule of benefits for permanent total disability.
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66%% of his average weekly
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a
dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of the injury per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more than 312
weeks; and provided further, that afindingby the commission of permanent total disability shall in
all cases be tentative and notfinaluntil such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall
be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational
rehabilitation under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of
the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fond
provided for by section 35-1-68(1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of
such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally follow the practice
applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation of employees having combined
injuries. If and when the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with
the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the
division the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to
such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% of his average weekly wages at the time of the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5
for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such

121

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out
of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1), for such period of time beginning with the
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance
carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled
to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation
as set forth herein..
Commencing July I, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally disabled and on that date
or prior thereto were receiving compensation benefits from the special fund provided for by section
35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week.
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally disabled on or before
March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall
be paid compensation benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68(1) at a rate
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer or insurance carrier
compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of
the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to
perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be
heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of
bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of bothhands or both arms, or both feet or both
legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall constitute total and permanent disability, to be
compensated according to the provisions of this section and no tentativefindingof permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, and where there has been
rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon
partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section,
including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week for 312 weeks.
[Effective May 13, 1975-May 9, 1977.]
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eyeglasses, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide a
replacement of the artificial means or appliance.
(4) An administrative law judge may require the employer
or insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or
appliances or provide the employee with a replacement of any
artificial means or appliance for the reason of breakage, wear
and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence.
(5) An administrative law judge may, in unusual cases,
order, as the administrative law judge considers just and
proper, the payment of additional sums:
(a) for burial expenses; or
(b) to provide for artificial means or appliances.
1997

M

34A-2-419. • Agreements i n addition to compensation
and benefits.
(1) (a) Subject to the approval of the division, any employer
securing the payment of workers' compensation benefits
for its employees under Section 34A-i2-201 may enter into
or continue any agreement with the employer's employees
to provide compensation or other benefits in addition to
the compensation and other benefits provided by this
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(b) An agreement may not be approved if it requires
contributions from the employees, unless it confers benefits in addition to those provided under this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at least commensurate with the contributions.
(c) An agreement for additional benefits may be terminated by the division if;
(i) it appears that the agreement is not fairly
administered;
(ii) its operation discloses defects threatening its
solvency; or
(iii) for any substantial reason it fails to accomplish the purposes of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(d) If the agreement is terminated, the division shall
determine the proper distribution of any remaining assets.
(e) The termination under Subsection (l)(c) becomes a
final order of the commission effective 30 days from thedate the division terminates the agreement, unless.within
the 30 days either the emplo3rer or employee files an
application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication
in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication. The application
for hearing may contest:
(i) the recommendation to terminate the agreement;
(ii) the distribution of remaining assets after termination; or
(iii) both the recommendation to terminate and the
distribution of remaining assets.
(2) (a) Any employer who makes a deduction from the
wages or salary of any employee to pay for the statutory
benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) Subject to the supervision of the division, nothing in
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act,
may be construed as preventing the employer and the
employer's employees from entering into mutual contracts and agreements respecting hospital benefits and
accommodations, medical and surgical services, nursing,
and medicines to be furnished to the employees as provided in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act, if no direct or indirect profit is made by any
employer as a result of the contract or agreement.
(3) The purpose and intent of this section is that, where
hospitals are maintained and medical and surgical services
and medicines furnished by the employer from payments by,
or assessments on, the employer's employees, the payments or
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assessments may not be more or greater than necessary to
make these benefits self-supporting for the care and treatment
of the employer's employees. Money received or retained by
the employer from the employees for the purpose of these
benefits shall be paid and applied to these services. Any
hospitals so maintained in whole or in part by payments or
assessment of employees are subject to the inspection and
supervision of the division as to services and treatment
rendered to the employees.
1997
34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission —
No authority to change statutes of limitation
— Authority to destroy records — Interest on
award — Authority to approve final settlement claims,
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over
each case shall be continuing.
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board in accordance with
Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or
change a former finding or order of the commission.
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in
any respect the statutes of limitations contained in other
sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the
statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (l)(c).
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and
inactive for ten years, other than cases of total permanent
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section
34A-2-417, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date
when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due 3R"
and payable.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-108, •
an administrative law judge shall review and may approve the i
agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final:
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disabil-.|
ity, or death benefit entitlements under this chapter or 3
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or
(h) commutation and settlement of reasonable future|
medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements underj
this chapter or Chapter 3 by m^ans of a lump sumj
payment, structured settlement, or other appropriate|
payout.
19^1
*

34A-2-421. Lump-sum payments.
An administrative law judge, under special circumstance^
and when the same is deemed advisable, may commutf
periodic benefits to one or more lump-sum payments.
1*
34A-2-422. C o m p e n s a t i o n e x e m p t from execution;
Compensation before payment shall be exempt from;
claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution, f
shall be paid only to employees or their dependents.
34A-2-423. Survival of claim in case of death.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) M Estate w is as defined in Section 75-1-201.
(b) "Persona! representative 7 ' is as defined in Se^
75-1-201.
(2) The personal representative of the estate of ^ . ^ ^
may adjudicate an employee's claim for compensatioii. ; ^
this chapter if in accordance with this chapter, the-emg^
files a claim:
(a) before the employee dies; and
.
(b) for compensation for an industrial a c c i d e ^ |
pational disease for which compensation is P a | ^ g
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 1
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^commission finds that the employee is entitled to
:;%>n under this chapter for the claim described in
,r: ;/2)(a)t the commission shall order that compensat e d for the period:
JTbeginning on the day on which the employee is
fied to receive compensation under this chapter; and
^ ) ending on the day on which the employee dies.
l(a)\Compensation awarded under Subsection (3) shall
""-paid to:
k
-.. (j) if the employee has one or more dependents on
*'-' the day on which the employee dies, to the depen" dents of the employee; or
(ii) if the employee has no dependents on the day
on which the employee dies, to the estate of the
employee,
(b) A e commission may apportion any compensation
i paid to dependents., under this Subsection (4) in the
-, manner that the commission considers just and equitable.
5) 4f an employee that files a claim under this chapter dies
% the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the
^is of the employee's claim, the compensation awarded
^der this section shall be in addition to death benefits
"yarded in accordance with Section 34A-2-414-.
2003
PART 5
INDUSTRIAL NOISE
J34A-2-501. Definitions.
(1) "Harmful industrial noise" means:
(a) sound that results in acoustic trauma such as
sudden instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or
impact noise "exceeding 140. dB peak sound pressure
levels; or
(b) the sound emanating from equipment and machines during employment exceeding the following permissible sound levels, dBA slow response, and corresponding durations per day, in hours:
Sound Level
90
92
95
97
100
102
105
110
115

Duration
8
6
4
3
2
1.5
1.0
0.5~
0.25 or less

34A-2-507

(2). A claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful
industrial noise may not be paid under this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, unless it can be
demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test that
the employee has been exposed to harmful industrial noise as
defined in Section 34A-2-501 while employed by the employer
against whom the claim is made1997
34A-2-504. Loss of h e a r i n g — E x t e n t of e m p l o y e r ' s
liability.
(1) An employer is liable only for the hearing loss of an
employee that arises outof and in the course of the employee's
employment for that employer.
(2) If previous occupational hearing loss or nonoccupational
hearing impairment is established by competent evidence, the
employer may not be liable for the prior hearing loss so
established, whether or hot compensation has previously been
paid or awarded. The employer is liable only for the difference
between the percentage of hearing loss presently established
and that percentage of prior hearing loss established by
preemployment audiogram or other competent evidence.
(3) The date for compensation for occupational hearing loss
shall be determined by the date of direct head injury or the
last date when harmful industrial noise contributed substantially in causing the hearing loss.
1997
34A-2-505. Loss of h e a r i n g — C o m p e n s a t i o n for perm a n e n t p a r t i a l disability.
(1) Compensation for permanent partial disability, for binaural hearing loss! shall be determined by multiplying the
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 109 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter or Chapter 3^ Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(2) When an employee files one or more claims for hearing
loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist
shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission.
(3) In no event shall compensation benefits be paid for total
or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 109 weeks of compensation benefits.
1997
34A-2-506* Loss of h e a r i n g — Time for filing claim.
An employee's occupational hearing loss shall be reported to
the employer pursuant to Section 34A-2-407 within 180 days
of the date the employee:
(1) first suffered altered hearing; and
' (2) knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known, that the hearing loss was caused by
employment.
1997,

34A-2-507. M e a s u r i n g h e a r i n g loss.
(1) The degree of hearing loss shall be established, no.
sooner than six weeks after termination of exposure to the
harmful industrial noise, by audiometric determination of
hearing threshold level performed by medical or paramedical
professionals recognized by the commission, as measured from
0 decibels on an audiometer calibrated to ANSI-S3.6-1969,
American National Standard "Specifications for Audiometers"
34A-2-502. I n t e n s i t y t e s t s .
(1) The commission may conduct tests to determine the (1969).
(2) (a) In any evaluation of occupational hearing loss, only
intensity of noise at places of employment.
hearing levels at frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and
(2) An administrative law judge may consider tests con3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) shall be considered. The
ducted by the commission, and any other tests taken by
individual measurements for each ear shall be added
authorities in the field of sound engineering, as evidence of
together and. then shall be divided by four to determine
harmful industrial noise.
1997
the average decibel, loss in each ear.
(b) l b determine the percentage of hearing loss in each
34A-2-503. Loss of h e a r i n g — O c c u p a t i o n a l h e a r i n g
ear, the average decibel loss for each decibel of loss
loss d u e t o n o i s e to b e compensated*
exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 1.5% up to the
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful
industrial noise or by direct head injury shall be compensated
maximum of 100% which is. reached at 91,7 decibels.
according to the terms and Digitized
conditions
chapter
or Law(3)
Binaural
hearing
the percentage
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by of
the this
Howard
W. Hunter
Library,
J. Reuben
Clarkloss
LaworSchool,
BYU.
Chnnfoi- 5* TTtaVi Owuoational Disease Act.
hearing
loss contain
is determined
Machine-generated
OCR, may
errors. by:
(2) "Loss of hearing" means binaural hearing loss measured
in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000
cycles per second (Hertz). If the average decibel loss a t 500,
1,000,2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels
or less, usually no hearing impairment exists.
1997
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
KELARIMECHAM, personal
representative of the estate of
THOMAS KELLER, deceased,
Applicant,
ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

vs.
SCOTTS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE,
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

Case No. 05-0406
:

Respondents.

Kelari Mecham, in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Thomas Keller,
deceased, (ctthe Estate" hereafter) asks the Utah Labor Commissioner to review Administrative Law
Judge Sessions' dismissal of the Estate's claim for permanent total disability compensation under the
Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, on behalf of Mr.
Keller.
The Labor Commissioner exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §
63G-4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers
Compensation Act.

BACKGROUND
While employed by Scotts Roustabout Services on July 25, 1976, Mr. Keller was injured in a
work-related accident. In 1978, the Utah Industrial Commission (predecessor to the current Labor
Commission) approved an agreement between Mr. Keller, Scotts Roustabout Services, and its
insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance Co., (referred to jointly as "Scotts" hereafter) for payment of
permanent partial disability compensation to Mr. Keller.
In December 2000, Mr. Keller filed an application for hearing with the Commission claiming
permanent total disability compensation from Scotts and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF")1
for permanent total disability compensation. Mr, Keller died on September 3,2002. On October 23,
2002, Judge Eblen dismissed Mr. Keller's claim on the grounds that the claim was extinguished by
his death. Judge Eblen's ruling was not contested and became final on November 23, 2002.
Under the law in effect at the time of Mr. Mecham's accident in 1976, the ERF is liable for a
portion of the benefits paid to individuals who are permanently and totally disabled as a result of
work-related injuries. See § 34A-2-413(3) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
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On April 25,2005, the Estate filed a new application for hearing, seeking to compel Scotts
and the ERF to pay permanent total disability compensation to the Estate for Mr. Keller's alleged
permanent total disability. Scotts and the ERF moved for dismissal of the application. On June 16,
2006, Judge Sessions granted the motions on the grounds, among others, that the Estate was not
entitled to pursue a claim for permanent total disability compensation under the circumstances of this
case.
In its motion for review in this matter, the Estate challenges each of the grounds upon which
Judge Sessions dismissed the Estate's application. However, because the Commission concludes
that Judge Sessions was correct in his determination that the Estate is not entitled to pursue benefits
in this matter, the Commission limits its discussion to that that issue.
DISCUSSION
Prior to 2003, Utah's appellate courts had ruled that "[t]he right to compensation for injuries
is a right personal to the employee and unless payments have accrued or a determination has been
made by the Commission there is no right to which the personal representative or a dependent can
succeed
" Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial Commission, 218 P.2d 970,974 (Utah
1950).
As already noted, Mr. Keller hadfileda claim for permanent total disability compensation in
December 2000, but died in 2002 while the foregoing rule was in effect. For that reason, Judge
Eblen dismissed Mr. Keller's then-pending claim. As also noted, there was no effort to appeal Judge
Eblen's decision. Consequently, the determination that Mr. Keller's claim terminated upon his death
became final and binding on November 23, 2002, 30 days after Judge Eblen issued the decision.
The Commission notes the Estate's effort to revive this matter by relying on § 34A-2-423 of
the Workers' Compensation Act. However, that statute was not enacted until 2003, after Judge
Eblen's ruling already had become final. The Commission concludes that, under these
circumstances, § 34A-2-423 does not apply to the Estate's claim.
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Sessions' decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this 3L

day of March, 2009.

Sherrie Hayashi
Utah Labor Commissioner
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Kelari
Mecham, Personal Representative of the estate of Thomas Keller, Case No. 05-0406, was mailed
first class postage prepaid this 5 r d a y of March, 2009, to the following:
Kelari Mecham
Personal Representative, Estate of Thomas
Keller
Box 803
Roosevelt UT 84066
Scotts Roustabout Service
Not Available
Employers Reinsurance Fund
160E300S
P O Box 146611
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Travelers Insurance Co
PO Box 173762
Denver CO 80217

Virginius Dabney, Esq.
1060SMainStSte2
St George UT 84770

Mark R. Sumsion, Esq.
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson
Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 84110
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
One Utah Center 13th FI
201 S Main St '
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800

KELARI MECHAM PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Case No. 05-0406

S C O T T S ROUSTABOUI SERVICE and/or
Judge Jlsili1 W Sessions
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND;
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO,
Respondent

THIS MATTER comes before the Labor Commission by way of a Motion to Dismiss
filed by the Employers Reinsurance Fund and Respondent Scotts Roustabout Service. While the
record shows that each Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss, they are treated as one motion
for purposes of this Order.
The issues raised by each party can be summarized as follows:1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Respondent argues that no provisions of the Utah. Code Annotated and in particular
the Worker's Compensation Act permit a personal representative of an injured worker
to file a claim for permanent total disability compensation. Petitioner argues that no
provisions prohibit a claim to be initiated by Petitioner's estate.
The claim filed by the injured worker in a prior case was dismissed without prejudice
and there is no basis for the estate of the injured worker to seek permanent total
disability compensation.
The Respondent(s) assert that the Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction to proceed to
hear this matter and the Application for Hearing should be dismissed.
Benefits after death are limited to those already accrued during life.
Utah Code Ann., §35-1-67 in effect at the time of injury applies in this case. That
statute required the Labor Commission to refer the injured worker who had been
found to be tentatively permanent total disabled to the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation. Only after full cooperation and inability to be rehabilitated was
demonstrated did permanent total disability compensation payments commence.
Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-423 became new law in 2003 and cannot be retroactively
applied in this case.
Dismissal of the Application for Hearing in this case in the earlier filing was without
prejudice and therefore preserved the right to re-file in the estate.
Both parties argue the application or denial of the application of a statute of
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limitations in permanent total disability cases.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
From the arguments of counsel, the following facts are not disputed. They form the
basis for the legal arguments in the briefs submitted with the motion(s) and the responses thereto.
They are:
A.
B.
C
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

July 25, 1975 Petitioner was injured in a compensable industrial accident,
June 29, 1978 a Compensation Agreement was approved by the Commission.
August 14, 1978 the Commission issued a Lump Sum Order.
December 1, 2000 the injured worker filed an Application for Hearing claiming
permanent total disability compensation.
May 21, 2002 the Commission granted a Motion to Compel Petitioner to
cooperate with discovery.
September 3, 2002 Petitioner died.
October 23, 2002 the Commission dismissed the Application for Hearing without
prejudice. No objection was filed and no appeal taken from that final order.
April 25, 2005 the estate of the injured worker, by and through the duly
appointed personal representative, filed a new Application for Hearing and
entitled it "Amended Application for Hearing." This application sought
permanent total disability compensation and interest. It alleged industrial
accident, occupational disease and death claims. In the Applicant's Amended
Pre-trial Disclosures filed by Petitioner's Estate, the claim is reduced to
permanent total disability benefits only.
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE #1: Respondent argues that no provisions of the Utah Code Annotated and in
particular the Worker's Compensation Act permit a personal representative of an injured
worker to file a claim for permanent total disability compensation. Petitioner argues that
no provisions prohibit a claim to be initiated by Petitioner's estate.
This issue is best seen in light of the language of the Workers Compensation Act.
Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-413(l)(b) provides that: "To establish entitlement to permanent total
disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of
evidence... ." (Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-104(l)(b) defines employee as
"each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employs one
or more workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same
establishment.. . ." There is no provision in the Workers Compensation Act that acknowledges
a personal representative in any manner.
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While it is true that there are neither permissive or prohibitive terms pertaining to a
personal representative making a filing for permanent total disability benefits, reason and
reasonable inference can supply the answer. Utah Code Ann., §63-46(b)(l)(a) of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") defines "party" as "the agency or other persons
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding." See also Carter v. Sportform Health, Labor
Commission #00-0675 (February 2002). In no case does the Worker's Compensation Act or
UAPA refer to or imply that anyone can commence an action except in death benefit cases
(which is not the case here) other than the injured employee. U.C.A,§34A-2-423 also requires
that that the employee file a claim before he dies in order to preserve adjudication of his claim
after he has died
The only and best source of the physical characteristics of an injured worker is the
actual injured worker. Without the worker, there can be no meaningful evaluation of a claim for
disability including partial or total and temporary or permanent conditions as well. Death
benefits aside, there is a burden on the injured worker to demonstrate proof of the permanent and
total disability factors as required by statute that would have been in effect at the time of injury,
Latorre v. Delta Airlines, Labor Commission #00-1144 (September 2002); Abel v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d 367 (UT. APP. 1993), to wit: Utah Code Ann., §35-1-67.
In 1975, §35-1-67 was amended to require permanent total disability benefits to be
determined by a process. First, a tentative finding of permanent total disability must be made.
Then it was mandatory for the employee to be referred to the Utah Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation under the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. Only when, after
fiill cooperation of the injured worker, the Division determined that the injured worker could not
be rehabilitated and the Division so certified to the Labor Commission, would benefits
commence.
It follows that the express language of the statute cannot be complied with u . die
injured worker is deceased. It is true that the estate could supply some of the medical
information and other relevant information. However, the ultimate required finding and
certification from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation would not be possible given that a
deceased person would not be able to fully cooperate with rehabilitation services. As a result,
the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
ISSUE #2: The claim filed by the injured worker in a prior case was dismissed without
prejudice and there is no basis for the estate of the injured worker to seek permanent total
disability compensation.
The Application for Hearing was dismissed without prejudice and the ALJ included in
the order the notice of rights to appeal. No objections thereto were made and no appeal was
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taken. In this way, the dismissal became voluntary. Although the dismissal was not sought by a
party, no party resisted the order and it could rightfully be considered a voluntary dismissal
under Utah law. "An ALPs decision becomes final 30 days after it is issued unless a motion for
review is filed within that period." Paulus v. Moroni Feed Co., Labor Commission #00-0882
(August 2004). Utah Code Ann., §34-46b-12(l)(a) establishes a 30 day jurisdictional time limit
for filing the Motion for Review. See also Giles v. Oakridge et al Labor Commission #00-1228
(July 2000).
The inquiry then turns on the effect of the dismissal without prejudice. For guidance,
we turn to the Utah Supreme Court opinion announced m Career Services Review Board v. Utah
Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997). "Indeed this court has also stated that a
"voluntary dismissal without prejudice 'renders the proceedings a nullity and leave the parties as
if the action had never been brought.5" Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872 P.2d 1036 (Utah
1994)(quoting In re Piper Aircraft Distribution Systems Antitrust Litigation, 551 F.2d 213, 219
(8th Cir. 1977). .. .[W]e see no reason .. .why the effect should not be the same for the dismissal
of an appeal from the decision or order of an administrative agency." The effect is "the dismissal
of his action and the right to bring a later suit on the same cause of action, without adjudication
of the merits-" Barton. (Other citations omitted.)
In another case, Bowles v. State, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court
explained in footnote 3 of the opinion: "[tjhere are numerous rulings to the effect that a dismissal
may be final for the purpose of appeal although it is without prejudice to the bringing of another
action . . .4 AmJur.2d, Appeal & Error §108 and cases cited therein. See also Sherry v. Sherry,
622 P.2d 9960 (Alaska 1981); and Carter v. Small Business Administration, 573 P.2d 564 (Colo.,
1977)/' The ALJ dismissed the instant case without prejudice and included the Notice of Rights
of Appeal at the close of the Order. It was a final order. No appeal was taken. No party
protested the order and the dispute appeared resolved.
McVinnie v. University of Utah Hospital 2004 UT App 63 (UT. CT. APP. 2004)
states: The dismissal without prejudice in this case "disposed of the case and has the effect of a final order, thus permitting appellate review/' Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, Pl,n.2, 999
P.2d 588. Because the dismissal concluded the action on the complaint and would require
McVinnie to file a new complaint after fully complying with all statutory prerequisites, it is final
for purposes of appeal. See Bowles v. State, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982)(stating if a new action
must be commenced, the judgment ending the action is final for purposes of appeal). Such is the
case here. The injured worker would have to start the case again by filing a new Application for
Hearing. The dismissal was a final appealable order from which no appeal was taken. The
Motion to Dismiss should be granted on this basis.
ISSUE #3: The Respondent(s) assert that the Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction to
proceed to hear this matter and the Application for Hearing should be dismissed.
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This issue raises jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann., §34A-1-301 confers jurisdiction and
power to the Labor Commission. That statute provides u[t]he commission has the duty and the
full power, jurisdiction and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or
any other title or chapter it administers/1 The Commission may exercise such powers only as are
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. University of Utah v.
Industrial Commission, 229 P. 1103 (Utah 1924); Parker v. Industrial Commission, 241 P. 362
(Utah 1925).
In the instant case, an Application for Hearing has been filed. Although incorrectly
entitled "Amended Application for Hearing" the application has invoked the jurisdiction over the
filing itself. A determination must be made as to the sufficiency of the filing and the standing of
the person(s) involved in bringing the matter before the Labor Commission. The Labor
Commission does have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim in all of its aspects from that point of
filing.
However, when standing is considered it might well be noted that by previous
discussion in this decision, it would not be wise to permit claims that were not appropriately filed
by a living injured worker to be filed posthumously through his estate (excepting death benefit
claims) when the estate is not capable of demonstrating compliance with existing law at the time
of injury. In that sense, the Labor Commission must determine whether the relief requested can
be granted. When it cannot, the claim is moot and must be dismissed. "It is a well established
principle of Utah law that courts, and by extension, administrative agencies, should not
adjudicate claims when such adjudication will have no practical effect. "'If the requested
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally
refrain from adjudicating it on the merits.7" (Citations omitted.) Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43,
45 (Utah 1981)." "Once a controversy has become moot, a trial court should enter an order of
dismissal." Merhish v. H.A. Folson & Associates, 646 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982)(quoted in Lu v. St.
Mark's Hospital, Labor Commission Appeals Board Decision #8010440 (January 2005).
The Labor Commission has jurisdiction to consider the current matter until it is
determined that adjudication will have no practical effect. The injured worker is deceased and
cannot participate in the matter as required by law to establish entitlement to a tentative and/or
final permanent total disability determination for benefits then to be determined. The issue is,
therefore, moot The case should be dismissed as a matter of law. The Motion to Dismiss
should be granted on this basis.
ISSUE #4: Benefits after death are limited to those already accrued during life.
This issue relies on the Utah Supreme Court decision announced in Pacific States Cast
Iron Pipe Co., v. Industrial Commission, 218 P.2d 970 (Utah 1950). There the court stated that
"under the terms of the statute . . . dependants cannot obtain the benefits . .. unless [the] claim
has ripened into an award for payments of compensation." Id, at 971. Further, the court
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reasoned, that "since no award had been made prior to the death of the employee and since no
determination of causation or the weekly amounts to be paid has been made before that time, it
would appear that no payments could have accrued. .. .It would, therefore, appear that had the
legislature . .. intended to modify the rule that unaccrued payments would vest rights in
dependents or personal representatives, it would have provided for tolling the limitation period
by the filing of a claim so that an award could be made after death." Id, at 974.
The legislature has not enacted a statute providing for filing after death, except in
cases where a death results from the industrial accident. In the instant case, the injured worker
died approximately 30 years after the injury of unrelated lung cancer. Based on this reasoning,
the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
ISSUE #5: Utah Code Ann., §35-1-67 in effect at the time of injury applies in this case.
That statute required the Labor Commission to refer the injured worker who had been
found to be tentatively permanent total disabled to the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation. Only after full cooperation and inability to be rehabilitated was
demonstrated did permanent total disability compensation payments commence.
This issue has been discussed and disposed of under Issue #1 above. Based upon the
reasoning included there and incorporated here by this reference, the Motion to Dismiss should
be granted.
ISSUE #6: Utah Code Ann., §34A-2-423 became new law in 2003 and cannot be
retroactively applied in this case.
The issue of which law applies has been discussed above in Issue #1. The new code
section is not an explanation of earlier statute, it is wholly new law. At the time the new law was
announced, the injured worker in this case had been deceased for some time and there was no
application for hearing pending to which it may have application even if it could be applied
retroactively. The Motion to Dismiss should be granted on that basis.
ISSUE #7: Dismissal of the Application for Hearing in this case in the earlier filing was
without prejudice and therefore preserved the right to re-file in the estate.
This issue was discussed in Issue #2 above. Nothing was preserved in the dismissal
without prejudice except a right to re-file. It is not the estate that had the right, but the injured
worker. (It is noted that by the time the dismissal without prejudice was issued by the ALJ, the
injured worker was deceased.) The inaction of the injured worker's estate at the time of the
dismissal showed acquiescence in the dismissal and the ALJ's order became final after 30 days.
Paulus; Utah Code Ann., §34-46b-12(l)(a). No right to re-file existed for the estate to file upon.
Nothing remained for the estate to relate to in filing the 'Amended Application for Hearing.5
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The initial application was a nullity. Barton. The failure to timely act on the order of dismissal
is fatal to the estate's argument.
Petitioner includes as an exhibit to his Response to the Motion to Dismiss both
references to and documents from the case of Smith v. Labor Commission, (UT. Ct App. Case
#20001019) (however the case numbers on the actual documents are Case No. 20010736-SC on
the Notice of Decision and Labor Commission Case No. 97-0408 on the Order of Remand and
on the Stipulation for Dismissal and Remand. The case was pending on appeal at the time the
legislature changed the law in 2003. The parties stipulated to a remand of the case. The
stipulation sets forth reasoning that is not in alignment with the opinion of Counsel on the
subject. The stipulation contains the following paragraph:
The Utah Legislature during its 2003 general session passed Senate Bill 126,
which has now been signed by Governor Leavitt. Among other elements, S.B. 126 adds
S34A-2-423 to the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, specifically providing that an
injured worker's pending claim for benefits is not extinguished by the worker's death."
PageR-2-055.
This evidences an understanding of the legislation that Petitioner's counsel (both in
that case and the instance case) has now abandoned. He would rather the ALJ detennine that any
benefits arising during life are continued in the rights of the personal representative in the estate
of the injured worker The better interpretation of the new statute is that the pending claims of
an injured worker survive the death of the injured worker. The new statute clearly states:
. . . (2) The personal representative of the estate of an employee may adjudicate an
employee's claim for compensation under this chapter if in accordance with this
chapter, the employee files a claim:
(a) before the employee dies; and
(b) for compensation for an industrial accident or occupational disease for
which compensation is payable under this chapter or Chapter 33 Utah
Occupational Disease Act. (Emphasis added.)
Because the estate failed to file and prevail against the ALJ's dismissal within the
period allowed by law, they lost the right to proceed on the Application for Hearing. The Motion
to Dismiss should be granted on this basis.
ISSUE #8: Both parties argue the application or denial of the'application < if a statute c ii
limitations in permanent total disability cases.
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The state of the law at the time of the injury governs the case. At that time, there was
no statute of limitations concerning permanent total disability claims. Vigos v. Mountainland
Builders, 993 P.2d 207, P14 (Utah 2000). However, there was a process by which the
establishment of such claims could be brought about. It is a fact that the injured worker did not
establish his claim prior to his death, but he had filed an Application for Hearing. Utah Code
Ann., §34A-2-423 did not yet exist. The injured worker's initial attempt to establish his claim
was dismissed after he was deceased. The estate failed to preserve his claim by filing a timely
motion for review of the ALJ's decision. Even if they had appealed, it is doubtful that any
change in the ruling of the ALJ would have been made. A deceased person cannot participate in
the statutorily required process to establish a claim under the 1975 law. There is no conceivable
way that the estate can comply with the 1975 law at this time. (See discussion of Issue #5
above.) No statute of limitations has application to the facts and circumstances of this case. The
Motion to Dismiss should be granted on this basis.
Finally, to the extent that Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, 993 P.2d 207 (Utah 2000)
requires that the Labor Commission acknowledge the prior filing as sufficient to overcome the
technical filing requirement, it would make no difference in this case. The relief requested by
the injured worker's estate cannot be granted because the injured worker is deceased and cannot
conform to the requirements of the 1975 statute which was in effect at the time of his injury. The
relief contemplated by the claim for permanent total disability compensation cannot be fairly
determined without the full cooperation of the injured worker. Accordingly, the claim is moot
and must be dismissed on that basis.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the * Amended Application for Hearing' filed
April 25, 2005 be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the scheduling clerk of the Labor Commission be
directed to cancel any further proceedings scheduled in this case.
DATED THIS June 16,2006.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Dale W Sessions
Administrative Law Judge
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NOTICE OF APPEAI RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Order was mailed by prepaid U.S.
postage on June 16, 2006, to the persons/parties at the following addresses:
Kelari Mecham Personal Representative
Box 803
Roosevelt UT 84066
Employers Reinsurance Fond
160E300S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Travelers Insurance Co
P O Box 173762
Denver CO 80217
Virginius Dabney Esq
1060SMainStSte2
St George UT 84770
Mark Sumsion Esq
50 S Main St Ste 700
P O Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 84110
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Edwin C Barnes Esq
One Utah Center 13th Fl
201 S Main St
Salt Lake City UT 84111
UTAH LABO:
(Cleff, AS^atication1
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THOMAS

v

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION W
160 East 300 South, 3d Floor, PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
KELLAR

Case No. 20001132
*

Q ^ r ^ : v U< •frvi'^
O C i k>''{-Z 4 V • ; ,?

*

Petitioner,

*
*

v.

HPT o .?
" f -• ":

*

SCOTTS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE
*
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UT*
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
*

/•>?>•••>*:

c
ORDER OF DISMISSAL"*"

v_.-

r

--

:

,

.' "!
'^

*

Respondents(s) .

*

The above captioned matter having been duly considered, and it
having been determined that:
The petitioner in this matter has passed away. Under current Utah lav^
his claim cannot proceed. However, the Utah appellate courts are reviewing this issue. Petitioner has not requested in writing that this
matter be held in abeyance until we recieve a ruling from the appellate
courts*

And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for
dismissing the claim,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Petitioner
be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission.
The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for review
and must be received by the Commission within 3 0 days from the date
this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the
Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission conduct the foregoing review* Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its Response. If none
of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board,
the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
DATED THIS October 23, 2002.
ILABOR

QiA^\

l a r o n J~ Eb]
A d m i n i s t r a t i s ^ Law J u d g e
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached
Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid onpk/cA^/'
<$ ^>
2002 to the following persons at the following addresses:
WORKERS COMPENSATION 392 EAST 6400 SOUTH P O BOX 57929
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157-0929
THOMAS KELLAR PO BOX 32 MYTON
SALTUT 84052
EDWIN C BARNES, Atty 201 SOUTH MAIN #1300 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2216
VIRGINIUS

DABNEY, Atty 1060 SOUTH MAIN STREET #2 ST GEORGE UT 84770

BRAD

BETEBENNER, Atty 50 S. MAIN STREET 7TH FLOOR
P.O. BOX 2465 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465
DEIDRE MARLOWE, Atty 160 E 300 S 3RD FLOOR PO BOX 146600 SLC UT 84114

UTAH
Kathy Houskeeper,' Clerky
ludication Division
(801) 530-6344 or (800)^ 30-5090
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Addendum F
Order Granting Motion to Cancel Hearing and Compel Petitioner to Cooperate in
Discovery dated May 21,2002
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Utah Labor Commission
Adjudication Division
Case No. 20001132

THOMAS KELLAR,
Petitioner,

*
*

v.
SCOTTS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE
and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE
FUND,
Respondents.

*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO
CANCEL HEARING
AND COMPEL
PETITIONER TO COOPERATE
IN DISCOVERY
Judge Sharon J. Eblen

FINDINGS OF FACT
The petitioner filed an application for hearing seeking the payment of workers'
compensation benefits on December 1, 2000 seeking an award of permanent total
disability benefits for accident which occurred on July 25,1975. An Amended Request
for Answer was mailed to the parties, joining Employers' Reinsurance Fund, on January
4, 2001 On January 30, 2001, ERF filed a Notice of Appearance naming new counsel
on the case. On , Itme 25, 2001, the ERF filed an answer denying liability on the claim.
On Novemer 28, 2001 this matter was scheduled for hearing in St. George, on January 24, 2002. On November 28, 2001, the ERF requested the matter be
rescheduled due to a calendaring conflict. On December 10, 2001, the petitioner
objected to rescheduling the hearing. On request of the petitioner and the ALJ the ERF
examined the schedules of its other potentially available counsel to determine whether
the matter may be reassigned to counsel available on the hearing date. However, no
other attorneys were available to take the case as scheduled. Therefore, on december
17, 2001, this matter was continued due to the calendaring conflict of Ms. Marlowe*
On January 9, 2002, the petitioner requested that the matter be scheduled for
hearing to motivate the parties to discuss settlement in a timely manner. Petitioner
mailed several letters to the ALJ requesting that the ERF waive its defense of no liability
in the event that the petitioner passes away before the matter is concluded. The ERF
has apparently refused to do so, which is itsright.On March 20, 2002, this matter was scheduled for hearing on June 3, 2002, All
parties are available for a hearing on this date. On or about March 6, 2002, Attorney
Marlowe sent an email to Attorney Dabney requesting several dates that Mr. Kellar
would be available for a deposition. Attorney Dabney refused to make his client
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available for a deposition stating, "Sorry, you should have done that before the !ast
hearing." Conditioning Mr. Kellar's appearance at a deposition on the E3F's waiver of
defenses in the event of Mr. Kellar's death before the matter is finally resolved. On
April 1, 2002, the petitioner wrote Attorney Betebenner requesting a computer printout
showing the compensation and medical expenses paid on the claim and threatening a
Motion to Compel should the requested information not be provided.
On May 10, 2002 the Adjudication Division recieved a Motion to Compel the
petitioner to cooperate in the taking of his deposition which was dated May 3, 2002. On
May 10, 2002, the division received a letter from Attorney Betebenner joining in the
ERF's motion to compel, indicating that there is important information which needs to
be obtained from the petitioner about his employment after the accident of July 25,
1975, his Social Security award and a third party action. As of May 21, 2002, the
petitioner has not responded to the Motion to Compel.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
All workers' compensation matters before the Labor Commission are governed
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, § 63-46b-1-22, U.C A ("UAPA") and the
Workers' Compensation Act, § 34A-2-101-803, U . C A UAPA provides that "the agency
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain ail
relevant information necessary to support their claims or defenses. If the agency does
not enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/1
The Workers' Compensation Act specifically provides that the commission is not
bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or
formal rules of procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the
commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" §
34A-2-802, U.C.A.
The Labor Commission rule regarding discovery provides:
Uponfilingof the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with
appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the
accident event, witnesses, as well as past and present medical care. The
defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed medical releases
to allow gathering of pertintent medical records. The defendant may also
require the applicant to submit to a medical examination by a physician of
the defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such
requests may result in the dismissal of a claim or delay in scheduling of a
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hearing.
R602-2-1.H U A C .
Section 34A-1-308, Utah Code provides that, "any party may in any investigation
cause depositions of witnesses residing within or without the state to be taken as in civil
actions."
ANALYSIS
Petitioner filed an application for hearing seeking permanent total disability
benefits allegedly caused by an accident on July 25,1975 in December 2000, A
hearing is scheduled on June 3, 2002, however, the petitioner refuses to cooperate in
making himself available for a deposition prior to the hearing. The petitioner refuses to
make himself available on the notion that the respondents should have completed
discovery prior to the hearing scheduled in January 2002. However, it is noted that the
petitioner requested discovery from respondents on April 1» 2002f weil after the January
2002 canceled hearing dateI here was no scheduling order entered in this matter limiting discovery to a
specific time frame. Further, Labor Commission rules do not specify a specific time
period by which discovery must be completed prior to a hearing. Although it is
desirable that the parties complete discovery well in advance of the hearing, the
respondents' request that the petitioner make himself available for a deposition in
March 2002 is not unreasonable. The petitioner has made it clear that he will not make
himself available for a deposition unless the. respondents waive their potential defense
that the claim dies when the petitioner does. Such a request is unreasonable and there
is no reasonable justification offered for the petitioner's refusal to cooperate in
discovery. Due to the petitioner's refusal to cooperate in scheduling a deposition, this
matter will not be ready for hearing as scheduled on June 3t 2002. Accordingly, the
hearing will be canceled and not rescheduled until the petitioner cooperates with
discovery.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for June 3, 2002 in
St George, Utah is cancelled based upon the petitioner's failure to cooperate with
discovery.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner may have until 5:00 p.m. on
Friday June 28, 2002 to make himself available for a deposition. If Petitioner fails to
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•

provide discovery by the above deadline, respondents may request that >his matter be
dismissedDATED this M

day of May, 2002.
THE LABOR COMMIS

laron J , Eblen ft
Administrative Law Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the21ST day of May, 2002,1 mailed a copy of the attached
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CANCEL HEARING AND COMPEL PETITIONER
TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY; in the case of Thomas Kellar v. Scotts Roustabout
Service and/or Employers' Reinsurance FnndfCase No. 2001132) postage prepaid to the
following:
TRUDY PENDLETON
1660 W SUNSET BLVD APT D1
ST GEORGE UT 84770-6514
VIRGMEUS DABNEY ESQ
1060 S MAIN STREET STE 2
ST GEORGE UT 84770
BRAD C BETEBENNER ESQ
PO BOX 2465
SLCUT 84110-2465
DEIDRE MARLOWE ESQ
leOESOOSS^FL
SLCUT 84114

^

KATHY HOUSKEEPER, LEGAlfASSISTANT
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

00113
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RICHARDS
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MILLER
NELSON
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P. KEITH NELSON
ROBERT LSTOVGNS
DAVID L BARCLAY t
BKETT F.PAULSEN"
LYNN S. D.AVIES
RUSSELL C FERiCKS
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAX
MICHAEL N. EMERY
MICHAEL P. ZACCHEO
GARY L. lOHKSON
CEOUGET. \Ar.t;i.E

CRAIG CCOBURN
S. BAIRD MORGAN
BRAD C. BETEBENNER
ROBERTG. UPRIGHT*
CHRISTIAN* W. NEISON tt
MATTHEWC BARNECK i
MARK L. MeCARTY
CARRIE T.TAYLOR
EMZAUETH A. HRUBY-MILLS
HOLLY B. PLATTER «
MKLINDAA. MORGAN"

BASTIAAN K. COfcBtRCH *
DIANA C M A T K I N
MARTHA KNUDSON
MARK R. SUMSION
BRIAN C WEBBER
BRANDON B. LlOBBS
WAYNE Z. BENNETT
ZACHARY E. PETERSON CHRISTIAN S. COLLINS
RAMON A E. GARCIA
CHURI M. STRINGHAM

OF COUNSEL:
ROBERT W.BRANDT
PETER K. ELLISON
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS (1<}29-2002)
ROBERT W. MILLER (1940-19S.T)
ALSOAOMITTEDIN:
t CALIFORNIA
* FLORIDA
MASSACHUSETTS
o WASHINGTON

"• A R I Z O N A

. COLORADO
tt IDAHO
= MONTANA
* WYOMING

KEY HANK TOWER
50 SOUT11 MAIN 7iU ELCX>R
POSTOITICE \i£>X 2#.S
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH M l 10-2465

October

(.SlU) 531-2CKX) PAX («U I) .S32-550&

E-MA11. AUURfiSS: mail©rlMnn.com

rhe Honorable Sharon J. Eblen
Labor Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
P.O.Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Re:

Kellar, Thomas v. Scotts Roustabout Service
Claim No.:
042CBAXW0159E
DOI:
7-25-75
RBMNNa: 6724-1568

Dear Judge Eblen:
On September 27, 2002, Mr. Dabney informed me that Mr. Kellar had unfortunately passed
away. He indicated at that time, he would be requesting this matter be stayed pending the outcome of a
current appellate case, which as I understand could purportedly allow Mr. Kellar's estate to pursue the
benefits accrued through the date of his death. However, I have seen no such request.
Based on the above, and the present state of the law, which terminates all claims upon the
injured workers' death, I request the hearing presently scheduled for October 29, 2002 be cancelled and
this matter be dismissed with prejudice. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
RICHARDS, BRANDI , MILLER & NELSON •

Mark R. Sumsion
cc:

Ms. Deidre Marlowe
Virginius Dabney
Barbara McDaniel
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Letter from Mr. Dabney requesting stay of proceedings
dated December 10, 2002

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LAW OFHCES
DABNEY & DABNEY
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December 10, io02DEC 9, 6 2002
Hon. Sharon J. Ebien
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
E£l
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JEAXJN1Q: 801-530-6333
it

Applicant: Thomas Kellar
Injury Date: 7/25/75
Employer: Scott's Roustabout Service
Carrier: Travelers Ins. Co. and KKF
Case N o : 2000-1132

Dear Judge Eblen:
Please lind encJosed a copy of Mi'. Kellar\s Death Certificate showing that he died on
September 3, 2002.
The Utah Labor Commission has taken the position for over 50 years that industrial claims
terminate when an injured worker dies. Even though there is no published decision orthis State's
highest Court indicating that, the misconstruction continues.
My office currently has five death cases, one of which is going to clarify this legal issue,
The Utah Supreme Court will be deciding the case of Orville E. Smith v, Utah Labor__Commission
next year Oral argument has been set. The decision in Smith will likely be dispositive of whether
Mr. Kellar's family, through his estate, may pursue his industrial claim. We respectfully request
that an Order staying proceedings in this case be entered pending a decision in the j^BJ^tca^e,

VD:bd
Enclosure
cc:
Mr. Mark R. Sumsion; Mr. Edwin C. Barnes; Thomas Kellar Instate c/o Ms. Kelari
Kellar; File
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